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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF CONGRESSIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS ON THE PRESIDENT'S POWER OF REMOVAL.-Upon his refusal
to resign after an exchange of correspondence in which President
Roosevelt requested his resignation and gave as his reason therefor
their divergent views on the policies and administration of the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, W. E. Humphrey was summarily removed
by the President from his office as a member of that body on October
7, 1933, before the expiration of his term. Humphrey, however,
insisted he was a member of the Commission entitled to perform his
duties and receive the compensation provided by law, and on his
death in February, 1934, his executor brought this action in the
Court of Claims to recover for his estate the salary allegedly due
the deceased from October 8, 1933 to February, 1934. Upon certifi-
cation by the Court of Claims of two questions involving the Presi-
dent's power to order the removal, held, for the plaintiff. The Act
creating the Federal Trade Commission provided that any commis-
sioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office.' Since the work required of the
Commission is in part quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, the President
had no power to remove for alleged incompatibility of a commis-
sioner's views with those of the President on social and political
problems in reference to the work of the Commission, as he might
have if the commissioner were purely an executive officer. Rathbun
v. United States, - U. S. -, 55 Sup. Ct. 869 (1935).
The removal power of the President has long been a contentious
subject in American politics; its nature always remained uncertain
while the courts tried to strike a balance between the alternate
dangers of legislative interference with the excutive and of executive
irresponsibility in exercising an unchecked power of removal. In
two previous cases the courts intimated that Congress could, by the
use of clear and explicit language, limit the power of removal by
prescribing a definite tenure, and providing for removal for no other
causes than those enumerated in the statute.2 In the instant case the
Court gleaned this intention of Congress from the language of the
Act,3 the character of the Commission 4 and the debates in Congress
138 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §41 (1926).
'United States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483, 6 Sup. Ct. 449 (1886) ; Shurtleff
v. United States, 189 U. S. 311, 23 Sup. Ct. 535 (1903).
'Supra note 1. Although the term of office is fixed and the causes for
which a comissioner may be removed are enumerated, we note that the Court
has held that the specification of a definite term was not equivalent to a
positive inhibition of removal by Congress before its expiration. Parsons v.
United States, 167 U. S. 324, 17 Sup. Ct. 880 (1896) ; Burnap v. United States,
252 U. S. 512, 40 Sup. Ct. 374 (1920) ; in Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S.
311, 23 Sup. Ct. 535 (1903) the Court refused to apply the usual rule of
construction that the affirmative language of the statute (similar to the one
under discussion) implied the negative of the power to remove except for
causes after a hearing; the facts of that case, however, were different.
' Sears, Roebuck v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A.
7th, 1919). It was to be non-partisan and from the very nature of its duties
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concerning the general purposes of the Act.5 But the Court still had
to hurdle the logic of the Myers decision 6 which rendered all execu-
tive and administrative offices of the United States removable by the
President at will. It did so by holding the Myers case controlling
only as to "purely executive officers," thus setting up the character
of the office as the basis for its judgment, and deciding, after a brief
discussion of the nature of the Commission's duties and personnel,
and the coequality of the departments of our government with the
attendant doctrine of separation of powers, that it did not include
the members of the Commission involved, who, when exercising any
executive functions, as distinguished from executive powers in the
constitutional sense, did so in discharge and effectuation of their
quasi-legislative 7 and quasi-judicial 8 powers as agents of the legis-
lative and judicial departments of the government. But the Federal
Trade Commission is an administrative body exercising primarily
administrative functions,9 quasi-judicial in form only,10 and only
secondarily a legislative agency.1 Nor does recourse to the doctrine
was to act impartially and enforce no policy except the policy of the law. 38
STAT. 719, 721, 722 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §§45, 46, 47 (1926).
SEN. REP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. at 10-11. The courts in constru-
ing a statute may consult the reports of the committee having it in charge.
McLean v. United States, 226 U. S. 374, 33 Sup. Ct. 122 (1912); Federal
Trade Commission v. Raladam, 283 U. S. 643, 51 Sup. Ct. 587 (1931).
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926). The opinion
of the Court met with vigorous dissent from three of its members and was
widely discussed and criticized at the time.
138 STAT. 721 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §46 (1926).
138 STAT. 722 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §247 (1926).
' Federal Trade Commission v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U. S. 619, 47 Sup.
Ct. 688 (1927); Arrow-Hart and Hegeman Electric Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 291 U. S. 587, 54 Sup. Ct. 532 (1934) ; Chamber of Commerce v.
Federal Trade Commission, 13 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
"Supra note 9; Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 421, 40
Sup. Ct. 572 (1920); Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260
U. S. 568, 43 Sup. Ct. 210 (1923); the authority given the Federal Trade
Commission to determine what methods of competition a given trader employs
and provisionally to determine whether such methods are unfair, subject to
the right to review by the courts, does not confer on the commission judicial
powers in view of the fact that the Commission's determination is not only
subject to review but is enforceable only by the courts. Nat'l Harness Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 268 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920). In
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 135, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926), we have dicta
to the effect that where duties of a quasi-judicial character have been imposed
on members of executive tribunals whose decisions affect the interests of
individuals, the discharge of which the President could not in a particular case
properly influence and control, still he might consider the decision after its
rendition as reason for removing the officers on the ground that the discretion
entrusted to them by the statute had not been intelligently or wisely exercised.
' Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 420, 24 Sup. Ct. 349 (1904); Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 365, 27 Sup. Ct. 367 (1907). Congress
in declaring the public policy and fixing the primary standard that is to control
and charging the administrative body with the duty of ascertaining facts which
bring into play the principles established by Congress may be deemed to invest
that body with quasi-legislative powers but it will not exercise, in any true
1935]
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of separation of powers help us, for we could easily, as Chief Justice
Taft did,12 put the shoe on the other foot and charge Congress with
destroying the principle of executive responsibility.' 3  State courts,
in deciding politico-legal problems of this nature, have held that the
various legislatures in the absence of express provisions in their
constitutions to the contrary could condition the executive power of
removal by a statute fixing the tenure of the office and precluding
removal except for specific causes enumerated therein.14 By dis-
tinguishing the Myers case the Court averted setting a dangerous
precedent and safeguarded the independence of various administra-
tive bodies set up by Congress similar to the one under discussion,
but the validity and effect of statutory restrictions on the power of
the President alone to remove civil officers will remain, however, a
subject of doubt and discussion because the terms "character of the
office" and "purely executive officers" have been left dangling in
mid-air without a basic principle 15 to which to fasten themselves and
must await further judicial consideration and determination. 6
A.S.
sense, either legislative or judicial power merely because it converts the
actual legislation from a static to a dynamic condition by determining some
fact or state of things upon which enforcement of the enactment depends.
Although the action of the Commission in issuing a cease and desist order
may be considered quasi-judicial on account of its form, with respect to powers
it is not judicial because its findings are not in the first instance embodied in a
decree of a court and enforceable by execution or other writ of the Court.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A.
7th, 1919).
"Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 164, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926). Since
the executive power is authorized to enforce the laws or appoint agents charged
with the duty of enforcing them and since the Commission is primarily an
administrative body (mtpra note 9) we might hold that such bodies belong
under the executive department under our form of government.
U. S. CoNsT. Art II, §3.
' See cases enumerated by Justice Brandeis in his dissenting opinion in
Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 249, 250, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926).
'Note (1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 353. The power of Congress to stipulate
the qualifications and tenure of inferior officers could rest on the "necessary
and proper" clause, U. S. CONsT. Art. I, §8 (18), thus conditioning the power
of appointment and the power of removal; nor do we find an express grant
to the President of such incidental power resembling those conferred on
Congress. "The Constitution has expressly granted to Congress the legislative
power to create officers and prescribe the tenure thereof." Myers v. United
States, 272 U. S. 52, 245, 47 Sup. Ct. 21 (1926) (dissenting opinion of JusticeBrandeis). .,Br Marberry v. Madison, 5 U.'S. 137 (1803) set up a standard for limiting
the President's power of removal to those officers appointed to aid him in the
performance of his Constitutional duties. In Ex parte Hennen, 38 U. S. 239
(1839) the Court declared that the nature of the power of removal and of
control over officers appointed did not at all depend on the source from which
it emanated, but that the execution of the power depended on the authority of
the law and not on the agent who was to administer it. In Parsons v. United
States, 167 U. S. 324, 17 Sup. Ct. 880 (1896) Congressional intention and not
Constitutional considerations determined the case.
